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Corporate Prisons  
1. Introduction 
“‘We ain’t got s*** in here,’ the inmate spat in his cell, ‘No rec time, no job, no respect, 
no organization. Inmates run this b****…when we get bored, we throw stuff out of the cell, we 
piss on the guards, we throw each other to the concrete. The guards can’t do nothing’” (Bauer, 
“My Time as a Private Prison Guard”). Many inmates, staff, and guards, as quoted above, feel 
that for-profit prison facilities cut corners in order to maximize profits. Without proper 
equipment, staffing patterns, and rehabilitation programs, many privatized prisons are simply 
unable to properly detain their inhabitants nor prevent inmate incidents. Inmates can “throw stuff 
out of the cells,” as well as participate in many other disruptive behaviors. When asked about 
this, a private prison guard answered, “We can intervene, but we don’t get paid enough for 
that…If we intervene and get hospitalized, then we’re stuck,” (17). Corporate prisons not only 
fail to properly take care of the inmates and staff, but also to increase efficiency and effectively 
reduce costs and, therefore, cannot be successfully assisting the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), 




Privatized prisons were first introduced as an alternative to federally run facilities and 
were an attempt to curb the issues of mass incarceration that began in the early eighties. In 1971, 
the War on Drugs was declared, making drug possession and other non-violent crimes shift from 
being viewed as social issues to criminal issues subject to punishment, allowing them to, for the 
first time ever, share the limelight with the Bonnies and Clydes—murderers, molesters, and 
robbers—making non-violent offences more viewable (history.com). This increased public 
awareness-turned-fear of crime called for more strict approaches to punishment. Mandatory 
minimums, longer sentences, and higher incarceration rates are just some of the tactics that came 
out of the “tough on crime” mentality of the early eighties, which created a new nemesis for the 
United States penal system: overcrowding (Eisen 12). No prison facility was prepared for the 
sudden tidal wave of convicted persons that needed to be housed. Facilities located in targeted 
neighborhoods, or areas in which drug activity was higher, were forced to transport several of 
their inmates to other prisons, which were now dealing with overcrowding themselves. Many of 
these facilities became understaffed, meaning that it was much more difficult to conduct classes, 
programs, and safeguard against contraband and inmate incidents, or any incident that causes 
harm to an inmate, officer, or corrections facility (Florida Department of Corrections 2). 
Additionally, more and more government budget was being spent on correctional facilities 
through the eighties and nineties. In fact, in 1988, the national budget for corrections was just 
under ten billion dollars a year, 70% of which was being spent by the state, which is money not 
spent on gentrification, schooling, hospitals, roadways, and other needs of the state (Donahue 6). 
Even with the increased funding, it still was not enough to equip these facilities. Many of them 
were forced to cut corners on recreation time, medical insurance, and food for the prisoners. In 
order to combat these problems, Core Civic was started in 1983 , using price as their comparative 
advantage to the federal BOP facilities (CoreCivic.com; Eisen 16).  
 
3. Problems  
3.1. Failure to Successfully Detain Inmates 
The fundamental purpose of a corporate facility is to prevent overcrowding in BOP 
locations as well as other issues that stem from overcrowding, such as inmate incidents, 
contraband, lack of organization within the facility, and cutting back on programs, classes, and 
“extras” such as insurance, recreation, food, etc. According to testimonials from inmates and 
staff at one of the larger for-profit prison companies, the Corporate Corrections of America, or 
CCA, it does not seem as if any of the issues related to overcrowding are addressed in certain 
facilities, in addition to the lack of attention given to both the staff and inmates. The staff 
complain about the lack of a competitive salary, proper equipment, and staffing patterns, while 
the inmates complain about the lack of educational programs, insurance, accountability for staff, 
and high-quality food and recreation time, all of which the privatization of prisons was supposed 
to prevent from happening (Bauer 14). If this issue was applied to any other industry, privatized 
prisons would have been done away with before now. If there was a business that promised to 
help alleviate a certain problem and twenty years later, there was no evidence of said problem 
being fixed, would consumers continue trusting the company? Of course not. So, why should the 
United States continue to allow these companies to house our prisoners when they are not doing 
what they are supposed to by alleviating overcrowding, inmate incidents, contraband, and better 
providing proper food and rehabilitation programs? Additionally, as quoted previously, the lack 
of organization in corporate prisons do not effectively detain prisoners. In Shane Bauer’s study, 
several inmates and staff complained about the staffing patterns, mentioning that, “At any given 
time, the inmates could take this facility…during (lunch time) there are over 800 inmates and 
only two corrections officers…” (Bauer 7). Regardless of the purpose of entrepreneurial prisons, 
a corrections facility in general must be able to effectively detain and incapacitate those housed 
there. The staffing patterns at CCA do not allow guards to effectively do their jobs, a source of 
frustration for several staff members (Bauer “Private,” page #). Because of all of this built up 
frustration with staff and inmates, turnover rate and overall dissatisfaction with the staff is 
pervasive, costing the CCA a good amount of money which, in turn, costs the state government 
more and eventually, tax paying citizens, such as you and I.  
 
3.2 Failure to Reduce Ethical Costs 
Privatized prisons, along with any other entrepreneurial venture, costs money, and 
typically a rather large amount of it. Entrepreneurial facilities are funded by the state 
government, who sends prison management companies a specific incentive to operate prisons. 
Suppose to house, feed, and clean one prisoner it would cost $100. The company then “marks 
up” the prisoner by reporting to the state or federal government that they need $200 to house one 
inmate. In this way, the companies make profits based on the number of prisoners they house, or 
“cost per head” (Investopedia.com). This presents a significant conflict of interest. In addition to 
the per capita salary, there is a larger temptation to reduce the cost per prisoner after the initial 
report. If a prison were to cut health insurance for inmate, the cost per head would drop from 
$100 to $75. That’s a $25 gain in profit, though the quality of life for the inmate is reduced. The 
question then becomes do corporate prisons operate first as a prison and emphasize rehabilitation 
and inmates’ quality of life and cut into profits? Or do they operate first as a profitable business, 
reduce rehabilitation programs, incarcerate more people, and focus on higher recidivism? With 
an emphasis on maximizing profits and legislature such as the Occupancy Clause, the latter 
appears to be true. Occupancy Clauses essentially are a quota of how many beds in a private 
facility need to be filled. Some of these clauses are simply break-even points, or how many 
prisoners must be housed in order for the company to stay in business. Others; however, are 
more ambitious, stating that they need 90% occupancy; such as Bay Correctional Facility in 
Florida (Leacock 2). Staying with the example of Florida, the state is required to ensure that the 
prison is 90% full, which equates to 837 inmates (4). If the facility has less than that, the state 
must pay fines equivalent to the amount of beds left unfilled. For Bay Correctional Facility, the 
Florida Department of Corrections paid over $40,000 for unfilled beds in 2015 (4). Essentially, 
the state paid $40,000 for an independent company to oversee an empty cell, and not just the 
state of Florida either. In fact, the CCA proposed 90% occupancy rates in 48 states, and several 
of those, including Ohio, Arizona, California, Louisiana, and Texas have agreed (Kroll 1), which 
means hefty fines for every empty bed in those states.  
What politician wants to pay fines that are unnecessary and easily avoidable? All that 
politicians need to do in order to avoid this is simply incarcerate more people, and then feel 
heroic for keeping criminals off the streets (Leacock 1). In this way, it is highly improbable that 
corporate prison facilities have a focus on bettering society, but rather, function primarily as a 
profitable, commercialized institution, which should be worrisome enough by itself. However, 
added to that fact is the realization that, due to the occupancy clause as well as other factors, 
there is no significant difference in operating cost from a BOP facility, which is the main 
argument in support of privatized prisons (Nelson 1).  
3.3 Failure to Reduce Fiscal Costs 
The general consensus about corporate faculties is that they are able to effectively reduce 
costs and overall efficiency, or the actual waiting period from time of construction to the time of 
full operation. Corrections is almost always among the top costs in both state and federal 
government budget. As mentioned previously, the budget for corrections today is just over $10 
billion (Donahue 6). With the U.S. government in debt as it is, the added financing for new and 
modified correctional facilities is not desirable, according to policy makers. They agree that 
private financing and loans are lower cost and typically are much faster than government 
transactions (Logan 78). Professor of criminology and strong supporter of corporate prisons 
Charles Logan states, “In 1991…(California) has reported needing $1.3 million for new prison 
construction. Assuming a 5% inflation rate and a 8-month to 10-month delay associated with a 
general obligation bond would result in $34 to $54 million increase in general construction 
costs…” (79). Essentially, it appears as though a minimum of $34 million could have been saved 
had the government not gone through the strenuous process of waiting for loan approval as well 
as government contractors. A private corporation typically gets approved or denied for a 
government loan within 3-6 months, versus a state government waiting just short of a year (68).   
 The argument that privatized prisons are more cost effective is simply not true. While 
privatized prisons are more efficient at being constructed, this does not necessarily equate to 
being less expensive. In fact, in a study done by the BOP in 2007 analyzing the cost of one 
privately owned prison, TCI, versus three federally owned prisons in the same state of Arizona 
concludes that, “Observed costs (of TCI) were generally higher than what the BOP expected to 
spend on TCI itself i.e. the costs that should have been avoided by the privatized sector…” 
(Nelson 1). Additionally, “Observed per person costs were not substantially different than any of 
the three observed BOP sites,,,” (2). Corporate prisons tend to look less expensive due to their 
efficiency, but when calculating cost per inmate, there is no substantial difference. Furthermore, 
the data used in the previously mentioned examples from California were from 1990 or later, the 
height of the rising crime rates and the beginning of mass incarceration, when BOP facilities 
were at their peak in expenses due to overcrowding. Additionally, the evidence provided about 
California assumes the longest possible wait for the general obligation bond, similar to how most 
of the evidence presented to prove that monetary costs for a federalized prison is higher than 
privatized prisons is largely based on an assumption. In contrast, when actual, not expected costs 
were analyzed and compared, there was no significant savings per person and the initial costs 
were, in fact, higher than expected in the TCI facility rather than the BOP one (2).   
 
4. Solution 
 Is the answer then to ban privatized prisons? Not necessarily. The problem is not 
inherently a for-profit prison corporation, the problem is not even connected to the penal system 
itself, although people enjoy blaming it. The problem lies in creating a system that accurately 
fulfills the need for justice without creating incentives for those who act in it (Surprenant 130). 
We should assume that people, whether employed by the CCA or the DOJ, will act in their own 
interest given the opportunity and ability. Many states, such as Michigan and California are 
pushing to ban all usage of privatized prisons in the U.S. and this may be a step in the right 
direction (Roth 1). While federal facilities certainly do not have the perfect system, there are 
checks and balances in place. BOP facilities are required to disclose information to the public, 
have stricter training for staff, and do not feel the pressure to maximize profits or hold on to 
contracts. While banning all corporate facilities is a radical move, it is not entirely implausible. 
Governments and prison managers should pay attention to the effects that California and 
Michigan’s movement has on the prison industry as a whole. However, prohibiting the use of all 
corporate prisons will not make all of the issues previously stated suddenly vanish. The core 
issue, as stated, is complying with the goals of the criminal justice system today and reducing 
personal incentives. Many systems, including federal ones, fail in this way (Surprenant 127). If 
the goal of the penal system is to incapacitate prisoners in a humane way, corporate prisons can 
effectively achieve this goal, if the necessary steps are taken. One possible solution not currently 
implemented anywhere is to treat inmates as consumers (120). If corporations want to manage 
prisons, then they should think of inmates as consumers and themselves as vendors or providers. 
They are for-profit businesses, after all, and they are providing services to the prisoners 
themselves. If corporate prisons shifted their thinking from a product-oriented, “If you build it, 
they will come” mentality, and focus on providing for their consumers, the financial incentive 
could be reduced significantly. The prisoners would be able to choose what facility they stay in 
and potentially pay for it themselves. Therefore, if an entrepreneurial facility wishes to stay in 
business, they must focus on quality over quantity when it comes to their consumers. Using this 
system, all facilities could become privatized, although that wouldn’t be necessary. It would take 
some time to implement this, as does any change in the criminal justice system, but it would 
drastically reduce incentives for individuals and corporations, abuse in the facilities, and poor 
equipment and staffing patterns (129). Costs would be reduced somewhat long-term, though 
initial implementation would be expensive. More importantly, the political incentives would be 
almost negligible as corporations have nothing to gain through lobbyism, just as politicians 
would have nothing to gain monetarily; therefore, reducing corruption in that way.  
 
5. Vocation 
Corporate prisons as they run today do not currently benefit inmates, the BOP, politicians, 
staff, nor tax paying citizens. Currently, public facilities seem to only benefit the owners and 
managers themselves. Inmates are treated unfairly as they are seen simply as a liability in these 
institutions, similarly to how staff are treated. The BOP and policymakers are tied up in various 
legislature and political scandals involving entrepreneurial prisons, and they are forced to pay 
hefty fines in order to keep these facilities running, despite private prison companies promising 
to make their lives easier. Because of this red tape, for-profit facilities cause citizens to pay more 
than they normally would for a federal facility, causing everyone more pain. If we want the 
department of corrections to look toward the common good and have everyone’s best interest in 
mind, then something needs to be done with these institutions, as they only benefit a select few. 
The common good is the idea that everyone benefits. Systems that were created with one person 
in mind must be modified in order to accommodate everyone, which is what must be done in the 
privatized prison industry. If corporate facilities began treating their inmates as consumers, it 
would naturally enforce the idea that they needed to benefit from the system somehow. With this 
mindset in place, we would be taking steps towards the common good. In order to even begin to 
think about getting close to achieving the common good, we must take small steps to help 
specific groups of people where we can. For me, this means looking specifically on how to 
improve corporate facilities efficiently, monetarily, and ethically. As I am an entrepreneurship 
major with an innate desire to help those on the wrong path, this presents a unique appeal to me.  
6. Conclusion 
The primary goal of a corporate prison is to successfully incapacitate convicted persons 
humanely, as well as reduce bureaucracy, costs, and overcrowding, and they fail. While the most 
obvious way to combat this is to put forth legislation to end all commercialized prisons, this does 
not effectively reduce the opportunity for personal gain within the criminal justice system, which 
effects all prison facilities, regardless of who manages it. Another, more feasible solution is to 
treat prisoners as what they are: consumers. They are consumers occupying prison buildings and 
taking advantage of the services offered in them, without them, the entire criminal justice 
industry would fail, so we should treat them as such. Allowing them to cast “dollar votes” in 
facilities of their choice could dramatically reduce personal incentive for these companies, who 
have a history of conducting business according to their own self-interest. This attitude is evident 
in the fact that they fail to properly care for their staff and inmates as well as dip their hands in 
politics, which corporate prisons should be avoiding. Despite cutting corners, entrepreneurial 
facilities still fail to reduce costs and efficiency, part of their reason for existence, the other being 
to reduce overcrowding, which they are also failing to do. This is mainly because of needlessly 
high minimum occupancy rates, as well as profiting off of the number of beds they fill, as they 
are payed “per head.” This leads to situations in which the guards are unable to do their jobs and 
inmates feel as if they run the facility. Regardless of all of this, there is simply the ethics of it. 
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